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5.1 Introduction 
In June 2008 the UK was hit by the biggest recessionary shock in living memory. The shock, 
which has subsequently come to be known as the "Great Recession", was felt across most 
developed economies in the world and many in the developing world. Its origins lay in a global 
banking crisis, linked to exposures to bad mortgage debts in the United States. The era of 
sustained economic growth enjoyed in the UK for nearly two decades was reversed almost 
overnight. Stock market crashes throughout the world were precipitated by investor uncertainty, 
firms suffered from sudden credit tightening, and demand for goods and services started falling. 
Whilst many of these immediate responses to the banking crisis were common across the world, 
each country faced specific difficulties due to differences in the nature of their economies and 
institutions and the position they were in when the crisis hit. The UK economy has performed 
particularly poorly in the intervening 6-7 years. In 2014, output per hour remained 0.4 
percentage points below the level seen in the pre-recession year of 2007 (Figure 5.1). This 
meant that labour productivity in the UK was 15-16 percentage points below the counterfactual 
level had productivity grown at its average rate before the recession; this compares with a 
productivity gap of around 6 percentage points for the rest of the G7 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2015b).2  
                                                          
2 Even if one shares the concerns of other commentators (Riley et al., 2014b; Pessoa and Van 
Reenen, 2014) that a linear extrapolation of the productivity growth that occurred prior to 
recession does not offer a reasonable counterfactual against which to judge the impact of the 
recession, it is nevertheless a useful starting point against which to make international 
comparisons. 
3 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.1 HERE] 
 
The fact that output per hour remained below its pre-recession peak so long after the onset of 
recession is quite remarkable. In purely accounting terms, the decline in productivity growth 
can be traced to two rather surprising trends. The first is the period of low output growth which, 
as Figure 5.2 shows, is unprecedented.3 It was only in 2013 Q3 that output returned to the 
previous peak seen in 2008 Q1, although comparatively strong growth in subsequent quarters 
left UK gross domestic product (GDP) 3.5 per cent larger by the end of 2014  (Office for 
National Statistics, 2015c).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.2 HERE] 
 
Second, the UK has been a victim of one particular success, namely the muted labour market 
response to the recession. Although employment fell in the quarters after the recession, the 
decline was nothing like that experienced in the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 5.3) 
and it was considerably smaller than the decline in GDP. Furthermore, employment recovered 
more quickly, exceeding its pre-recession level in 2012 Q3 (a full year before the recovery in 
output). 
                                                          
 
3 Indeed, the pace of recovery has even been slower than that following the depressions of the 
1920s and 1930s.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 5.3 HERE] 
 
Poor GDP growth and sustained employment levels thus combined to push down output per 
worker. The fall in output per hour was not as substantial in the period immediately after 
recession, since a growth in part-time working meant that hours per worker fell more steeply 
than employment; but there has been no overall progress on either measure of productivity since 
2007 (Figure 5.1). In this sense the UK stands in contrast with the United States where output 
per worker and output per hour have both risen steadily over the past 6-7 years and now stand 
around 7 percentage points above the level seen at the end of 2007 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2015b). 
 
Simply pointing to the trends in the numerator and denominator is only a starting point in 
seeking to understand what has become known as the UK's "productivity puzzle". There are 
really two puzzles. First, why has economic growth taken quite so long to recover in the UK?  
And second, why has the labour market responded so differently to recession this time 
compared to earlier recessions?  These are the questions addressed in this chapter. Throughout 
our discussion, we focus primarily on the trends in output per worker or output per hour worked. 
However, we also consider trends in total factor productivity (TFP), since changes in TFP 
emerge as a key component of the overall story.  
 
The remainder of this chapter comprises three sections. The first reviews the extensive literature 
on the UK's productivity "puzzle", examining some of the main culprits or suspects that may 
5 
 
explain recent trends. The second section contributes to the empirical literature by testing some 
hypotheses in new ways, in order to shed further light on patterns of productivity growth among 
British workplaces over the period 2004-2011.4 The third and final section looks to the future 
and comments on the prospects for UK productivity growth over the next decade or so. 
 
 
5.2 The usual suspects in the UK's productivity puzzle 
In this section we consider some of the key arguments that have been put forward for the two 
factors behind the UK's productivity puzzle, namely the slow rate of GDP recovery and the 
muted employment response to low growth. 
 
5.2.1 Measurement error 
There are some commentators who have cautioned that the UK productivity puzzle is not as 
puzzling as it may, at first, seem, because measurement errors in both output and employment 
may accentuate the real underlying trends. Although employment and hours figures may have 
become harder to collect with recent increases in immigration and rising self-employment, they 
are unlikely to be so problematic as to require a full reappraisal of the UK productivity puzzle. 
                                                          
4 The data used to perform this analysis are the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey 2011 (WERS) which is nationally representative of British workplaces with 5 or more 
employees (Department for Business Innovation and Skills et al., 2015). The survey does not 
cover Northern Ireland, which is why we talk of Britain, not the UK, when we refer to its 
findings. 
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Calculating GDP is more difficult. Although often subject to revision, Grice (2012) argues that 
these revisions are not sizeable enough to explain away the puzzle. However, Barnett et al. 
(2014b: 118) suggest that, taken together, measurement issues and output revisions could 
explain up to 4 percentage points (one quarter) of the productivity shortfall since the onset of 
recession. Inter alia they point to declining output in the North Sea oil and gas sector since the 
early 2000s which, if not fully accounted for, overstate the pre-recession growth trend. 
 
Finance has also attracted attention in this regard. It is possible that the reversal in GDP with 
the recession may have been exaggerated by pre-recessionary growth in the Finance sector, if 
this growth was illusory, reflecting over-exposure to bad debts and the production of over-
valued assets. In fact, Finance is treated as an intermediate input in national accounts so is not 
counted in the value-added underpinning GDP growth (Oulton, 2013). It is true that 
productivity grew rapidly in the Finance sector prior to the recession: gross value added per 
employee rose 156% in Finance between 1995 and 2007 compared with 65% in the economy 
as a whole (Bell and Van Reenen, 2010: 13). The Finance sector has also seen one of the largest 
falls in productivity of any sector since 2008 (Wales and Taylor, 2014: Figure 7). However, 
Finance only contributed around 10 per cent of the 2.7 per cent growth in value added per hour 
that occurred in the market sector over the period 1979-2007 (Corry et al., 2012), and it is 
estimated that productivity losses within Finance accounted for less than one fifth of the overall 
drop in output per hour from 2008-2013 (Wales and Taylor, 2014: Figure 8).  
 
Finally, one might also be concerned that the GDP figures are not as bad as they look because 
they do not capture intangible assets which, it is argued, are particularly large in the UK. 
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Although they do not appear on balance sheets because they are too short term, they can be the 
basis for future revenue generation.5 However, the most recent attempts to re-estimate 
productivity trends after capitalising R&D suggest that the picture changes very little 
(Goodridge et al., 2015). In summary, it does not seem that the productivity puzzle can 
primarily be explained through measurement issues.  
 
5.2.2 The Role of the Finance Sector in the Broader Economy 
Although productivity losses since the onset of recession can be partly attributed to losses 
within the Finance sector itself (see above), the fact that the recession was triggered by a 
banking crisis has broader implications. The international operations of the Finance sector mean 
that it is a much larger part of the UK economy than in most other countries in the world. One 
of the government's main priorities in the immediate aftermath of the Crash was ensuring 
stability in the banking sector. To this end, it underwrote the sector to the tune of £1.162 billion, 
and nationalised RBS and other parts of the banking sector.6  These actions were successful in 
                                                          
5 They have traditionally been treated as intermediate consumption rather than a form of 
investment. However, from 2014 R&D is treated as an investment and appears in the Blue Book 
as part of gross fixed capital formation, thus contributing to GDP. 
6 This is a National Audit Office estimate in relation to the provision of guarantees and non-
cash support (e.g. the Credit Guarantee Scheme, Special Liquidity Scheme and Asset Protection 
Scheme) and the provision of cash including loans to the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme and insolvent banks to support deposits, as well as the purchases of share capital in the 
Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group. See National Audit Office (2015).  
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staving off a full-scale banking collapse, but they were expensive, both in government time and 
in taxpayers' money, crowding out efforts which might otherwise have been devoted to 
stimulating demand with a view to returning to growth. That stimulus did follow with 
quantitative easing injecting close to £400 billion into the UK economy (Kay, 2013).  However, 
the stimulus was not on the scale of that undertaken in the United States and much of this money 
found its way onto company balance sheets, rather than flowing round the British economy, 
due to investor and consumer uncertainty. Uncertainty is known to play an important role in 
constraining corporate investment (Bloom et al., 2007; Bloom, 2009), but it may have played a 
particularly important role in the current recession, in part due to the policy uncertainty 
surrounding the sovereign debt crisis that unfolded in the Eurozone shortly after the Crisis 
began (Lane, 2012). That said, there is no indication in the OECD's standardised set of Business 
Confidence Indicators that the UK suffered a particularly dramatic decline in business 
confidence in the aftermath of recession relative to other countries (OECD, 2015). 
 
The banking crisis therefore had direct repercussions for productivity growth through its impact 
on output in the Finance sector (see Section 5.2.1 above) and by absorbing public finances that 
might have been put to good use elsewhere, but it may also have had indirect repercussions for 
productivity elsewhere in the economy through credit constraints placed on borrowers, 
especially for small and new businesses. Evidence suggests that both the availability and cost 
of bank credit were adversely affected by the onset of recession (Riley et al., 2014a). However, 
the significance of credit constraints in driving productivity weakness is less clear. First, banks 
are not a major source of credit for many companies in Britain: money for expansion often 
comes from internal resources or share issuance. Second, unlike the previous recession of the 
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early 1990s, company profitability had been high prior to the 2008 recession, such that many 
companies were cash rich and therefore capable of investing in growth if they wished, while 
interest rates were low. The fact that they chose not to do so reflected deep unease about the 
future prospects of the British economy.7  
 
An alternative perspective is that, far from credit drying up, banks and other creditors may have 
shown some forbearance to indebted firms. The fact that liquidations spiked briefly post-
recession but began to fall again shortly afterwards (Figure 5.4) is consistent with banks being 
reluctant to call in 'bad' debts, leading to the survival of what appear to be highly unproductive 
firms (sometimes referred to as "zombie" firms). This may have occurred if banks and other 
financiers were loathed to declare bad loans at a time when their own balance sheets were 
vulnerable. Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014) speculate that political pressures may also have 
played a part since the government, as the new owners of banks such as RBS, may have 
promoted forbearance to avoid politically damaging rising unemployment. However, 
Arrowsmith et al. (2013) find little evidence of substantial forbearance outside the commercial 
real estate sector.8  
                                                          
7 Corporations' failure to invest has also been a preoccupation in the United States pre-dating 
the recession. Lazonick (2014) reveals that between 2003 and 2012 the S&P 500 companies 
used 54% of their earnings - amounting to $2.4 trillion - to buy back their own stock, while 
dividends absorbed another 37% of earnings. 
8 Arrowsmith et al. (2013) found that only 6 per cent of companies outside commercial real 
estate were benefitting from bank forbearance in 2013. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 5.4 HERE] 
 
An empirical investigation of the influence of bank lending on productivity trends, in fact, finds 
only limited evidence that sectors with higher levels of bank dependence fared much worse in 
productivity terms through recession than did sectors with lower levels of dependence (Riley et 
al., 2014a; Riley et al., 2015). There is some evidence that the relationship between firm growth 
and relative labour productivity was weaker in the Great Recession in sectors with many small 
and bank dependent businesses, but the effect was short-lived (Riley et al., 2015). Hence, whilst 
bank lending to companies did fall more sharply in this recession than it did in the three other 
post-1970 recessions, this would seem to have accounted for only a small part of the overall 
decline in aggregate productivity. 
 
5.2.3 A Limited Cleansing Effect?  
Although there is little evidence of widespread bank forbearance, higher than expected 
employment rates and lower than expected bankruptcies suggest any cleansing effect arising 
from the recessionary shock was small. The "cleansing hypothesis" predicts productivity 
growth post-recession through the death of the least productive firms. The death of the least 
productive firms would raise aggregate productivity, albeit at the expense of rising 
unemployment, via a compositional change in the stock of firms. If this had occurred, one would 
anticipate some compression in output and productivity following the removal of less 
productive firms from the economy. In fact the variance in output rose after the recession across 
sectors (Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2013: Figure 13), as did the variance in gross value added 
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(Barnett et al., 2014a: R38; Barnett et al., 2014b: 123). The variance of productivity across 
establishments also rose, even within the same sector (Field and Franklin, 2013).  
 
Other firm-level and workplace-level estimates also suggest any cleansing effect of the 
recession may have been muted. Riley et al.'s (2014b) decomposition of UK market sector 
productivity growth between 2002 and 2011 indicates that the contribution of company entry 
and exit did not change very much over time. The proportion of loss-making firms in the 
economy rose significantly during post-recession (Barnett et al., 2014b: 124-125), and direct 
evidence on the rate of workplace closures indicates they were no different in the period affected 
by recession (2004-11) than they were in the more benign conditions in the period 1998-2004 
(Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). Harris and Moffat (2014b) even find evidence to suggest that, at 
least in manufacturing, it was the more productive workplaces (as measured by TFP) that closed 
in the period 2007-2012, running wholly counter to a 'cleansing' phenomenon.9  Redundancies 
did rise immediately after the shock, but returned to pre-recession rates shortly thereafter, 
indicating a short-run impact of recession (Broadbent, 2012: Chart 4). 
 
In their analysis, Barnett et al. (2014c) attribute one-third of the slowdown in aggregate labour 
productivity between 2007 and 2011 to impaired resource reallocation across firms. A 
diminution in the reallocation of factors of production towards more productive sectors via firm 
                                                          
9 In an earlier version of their paper, Harris and Moffat find a reduced annual rate of workplace 
closure in the Annual Respondents Database between 2007 and 2011 relative to the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. 
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entry and exit and labour movement can therefore explain some of the fall in productivity.10 
But, as both Riley et al. (2014b) and Barnett et al. (2014b) show, the chief contributor to falling 
productivity post-recession is attributable to within-sector and within-firm factors (Figure 
5.5).11 The implication is that, in order to further investigate the productivity puzzle, one needs 
to focus on firm behaviour – looking at issues such as labour hoarding, capital investment and 
innovation.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.5 HERE] 
 
                                                          
10 In the manufacturing sector in the United States there has not been the same degree of 
resource reallocation to more highly productive firms as occurred in the 1980s (Foster et al., 
2013). 
11 Intriguingly, a decline in TFP within-firms also appears to have occurred in the recession of 
the early 1990s, at least in manufacturing; but the extent of the decline was less extensive than 
in the most recent recession (Riley et al., 2014b).  
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5.2.4 Labour Hoarding 
The short-term spike in redundancies and the low rates of bankruptcies, liquidations and 
closures, are consistent with labour hoarding, that is, the retention of staff in spite of a 
substantial downturn in demand for goods and services. As an indication, Butcher and Bursnall 
(2013: Table 6) compare levels of employment contraction in ongoing firms over the periods 
2004-7 and 2008-11, and find no greater level of contraction in aggregate after the onset of 
recession. Furthermore, Barnett et al. (2014c) show that the proportion of firms with shrinking 
output but constant employment doubled through recession, from 11% in 2005-2007 to 22% in 
2011.  
 
Labour hoarding is most likely to occur when firms are uncertain about the timing of an up-turn 
in demand, and are thus prepared to hang onto staff rather than incur the costs of firing and 
rehiring (Martin and Rowthorn, 2012). The muted unemployment response to falling GDP is 
uncontested. However, the labour hoarding interpretation of this phenomenon is disputed: can 
firms really be underutilising labour so long after the recessionary shock? Some argue that firms 
are retaining high skilled labour having learned that they let high value-added workers go too 
cheaply in the previous recession.12 It is possible that the returns to firm-specific human capital 
have increased since the last recession, making skilled labour turnover even more costly. 
However, Goodridge et al. (2013) argue that skilled labour retention does not constitute 
hoarding. Rather, skilled workers may be producing intangible capital which is not measured. 
                                                          
12 Qualitative evidence in support of this proposition comes from the Bank of England's Agents 
(Barnett et al., 2014b: 120). 
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This could explain why we observe something which looks like skilled labour hoarding but is, 
in fact, mis-measurement of the output of skilled labour. Furthermore, higher-than-expected 
employment levels are due not only to lower-than-expected flows out of employment, but also 
to hiring rates which have been at or above their pre-recession average (Barnett et al., 2014b: 
121) and healthy rates of job creation in ongoing firms (Butcher and Bursnall, 2013: Table 6). 
It is difficult to characterise these patterns as labour "hoarding". 
 
5.2.5 The Flexible Labour Market 
Whether it is characterised as labour hoarding or not, firms are employing far more individuals 
than one might have anticipated given the sustained reduction in output. So why might this be?  
One possibility is that firms are taking advantage of the UK's flexible labour market. The UK 
is known for low levels of labour market regulation and, as such, we might expect to see higher 
employment levels and, perhaps, higher labour "churn", than in some countries. Certainly, the 
UK was experiencing historically high levels of employment prior to the onset of recession in 
2008, measured both in terms of the total numbers in the workforce and labour market 
participation rates. But what is at issue here is the labour market's response to that downturn. 
As noted in Section 5.1, the UK economy has more jobs today than it did at the pre-recession 
peak. It is true, however, that workers began working fewer hours, on average, with the onset 
of recession, which is why the immediate fall in labour productivity was not as dramatic when 
measured as output per hour compared with output per head (see Figure 5.1). The difference 
was accounted for by the increasing percentage of employees working part-time, and by a 
reduction in the average hours worked by full-time employees. The UK economy has 
effectively adjusted at the intensive, as opposed to the extensive, margin.  
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This has resulted in a growth in "under-employment" among those in the labour force, with the 
percentage of employees wishing to work more hours outstripping the percentage wishing to 
work fewer hours (Figure 5.6). However, there has been a recent increase in average hours 
worked such that they have returned to the hours worked shortly before the recession.13 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.6 HERE] 
 
Further evidence of labour force flexibility is evident in the growth of self-employment: the 
number of workers who were self-employed in their main job rose by 367,000 between April-
June 2008 and April-June 2012, most of the increase occurring between 2011 and 2012. This is 
an increase in the rate of self-employment from 13.0 to 14.1% (Table 5.1). However, not all 
forms of flexible employment contract have risen dramatically. In contrast to other European 
countries such as France, there has been no substantial growth in the use of temporary contracts, 
for example. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.1 HERE] 
 
                                                          
13 The seasonally-adjusted series for all workers (Office for National Statistics, 2015e) indicates 
that average weekly hours were 32.2 (37.4 for full-timers) in 2008 Q1 just prior to the recession. 
They fell to 31.5 (36.6) in 2009 Q1, only recovering to their pre-recession level in 2010 Q4 for 
full-timers (37.4 hours) and 2014 Q2 (32.2 hours) for all workers. 
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5.2.6 Declining real wages 
Since the onset of recession, the UK has experienced large and unprecedented reductions in real 
wage growth, with wages falling by more in the UK than in most other OECD countries (OCED, 
2014). Real wage losses have been experienced across the wage distribution, and the overall 
trend contrasts sharply with that seen in earlier recessions in the UK, when real wage growth 
was either broadly unaffected (as in the 1980s) or merely slowed down (as in 1990s). A 
substantial percentage of employees have also suffered nominal wage freezes, especially in the 
public sector (van Wanrooy et al., 2013), with pay freezes being just as common among union 
covered employees as they have been in the uncovered sector (op. cit.). Further, many 
employees have suffered nominal wage reductions, due to a combination of falling bonus 
payments, and reductions in overtime and normal hours, but many who have remained in the 
same job have even suffered reductions in basic hourly pay (Gregg et al., 2014b). 
 
This weakness in real wages has made labour particularly cheap for employers such that 
incentives to substitute labour for capital have increased. This may lie behind labour "hoarding" 
and healthy hiring rates, since a higher labour to capital ratio may be optimal for profits 
compared with the pre-recessionary period.  
 
To date analysts have been largely unable to identify the precise mechanisms by which labour 
market flexibility and real wage decline have occurred, though there does appear to be a strong 
correlation between movements in labour productivity and mean hourly total compensation 
(Gregg et al., 2014b: Figure 7). The decline in real wages is not due to the changing composition 
of the workforce (Blundell et al., 2014). Instead, real wage decline has occurred among 
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individuals staying within the same job year-on-year (Blundell et al., 2014; Stokes et al., 2014). 
The relatively high level of inflation in the UK since the onset of recession is likely to be one 
factor, since it is known that employees are less sensitive to real than nominal wage decline.14 
It is notable, however, that the rate of real wage growth first began to decline in the early 2000s, 
well before the onset of recession. The reasons are not well understood (see Gregg et al., 2014a, 
for a discussion), but one hypothesis is that the bargaining power of workers has declined, partly 
due to the long-run decline in trade union collective bargaining coverage, and partly through 
changes in the UK's unemployment benefits regimes which require benefit recipients to actively 
seek work and accept job offers even if they are not offering the wages or job prospects job 
seekers would ideally like.15  Consistent with this, Gregg et al. (2014a) demonstrate a marked 
increase in the sensitivity of real wages to unemployment in the 2000s, one that is particularly 
marked in the non-union sector. Another factor has been the growth in the labour force since 
2008: the UK's population rose from 61.4 to 63.1 million between 2008 and 2014, partly due to 
immigration, a labour supply shock that may have helped to dampened real wages. Indeed, 
                                                          
14 Askenazy et al. (2013) discuss wage dynamics across Europe in the crisis. Figures 6 and 7 of 
their report show that price inflation was particularly high in the UK, relative to large European 
countries, over the period 2009-11.  
15 This has spawned debate about labour's share and, in particular, whether wages have kept up 
with productivity growth. It does appear that real wage growth, measured as real producer 
wages, has fallen behind growth in output. However, part of the explanation lies in the 
increasing percentage of all labour costs going to pensions. When this is accounted for the gap 
is not apparent (Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2013). 
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Manning (2015: Figure 5.2) shows that, for a given level of unemployment, the share of hires 
from non-employment has risen in the UK since about 2000, suggesting that employers may 
have a larger reserve army of labour from which to fill vacant posts.  
 
5.2.7 Capital shallowing 
As noted in the previous section, another candidate for the decline in labour productivity which 
has attracted a great deal of attention is capital shallowing, that is, the decline in the capital-
labour ratio. This occurs when there are substantial shifts in the relative price of factor inputs, 
as happened with real wages in the UK. The UK has experienced one of the lowest rates of 
growth in hourly labour costs through recession: according to Eurostat, in 2013 they stood at 
20.9 Euros per hour, compared to the EU28 average of 24.2 Euros (Eurostat, 2015). The UK's 
hourly labour costs were static between 2008 and 2013, rising more slowly than all but three of 
the EU's 28 countries.16  At the same time, the cost of capital has risen, despite low interest 
rates, due to banks' reluctance to lend (Broadbent, 2012; Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2013). These 
trends create incentives for firms to reduce levels of capital investment and increase their labour 
usage. The increase in new hires since 2008 is striking and is consistent with "capital 
shallowing" (Broadbent, 2012: Chart 4). When uncertainty is rife, firms may feel more 
                                                          
16 On average, hourly labour costs rose by 13% over the period in the EU. Only Greece, Cyprus 
and Hungary experienced declines in hourly labour costs. Average hourly labour costs are 
computed as total labour costs divided by the number of hours worked by the yearly average 
number of employees. They concern all employees except those in public administration, 
defence and social security.  
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comfortable with investments in human capital than fixed capital since human capital is less 
"sticky" and can therefore be off-loaded if expectations regarding growth are not forthcoming 
(Bloom et al., 2007). 
 
The availability of good-quality data on capital per worker has historically been limited in the 
UK, and so researchers have often compiled their own series, leading to different views on the 
changing role of capital in the economy. For their investigation of productivity trends, Pessoa 
and Van Reenen (2014) constructed an estimate of capital stocks using the perpetual inventory 
method, estimating that capital per worker declined by 5 percent between the second quarter of 
2008 and the second quarter of 2012.  Their subsequent decomposition of changes in labour 
productivity suggested that capital shallowing caused by changes in factor prices could account 
for two-thirds of the decline in labour productivity since the beginning of the crisis. The decline 
in average hours per worker contributed another quarter in their analysis, while changes in Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) accounted for under one-tenth.  
 
However, Oulton (2013) has argued that Pessoa and Van Reenen’s series over-estimates the 
pre-crisis capital stock, and thus over-states the decline. Moreover, the relatively large 
contribution of capital shallowing to poor productivity growth that is suggested by Pessoa and 
Van Reenen has been challenged from a number of quarters. Field and Franklin (2014) compile 
their own measure of capital stocks and, using a growth accounting framework, suggest that 
much of the year-on-year change in labour productivity between 2008 and 2012 reflects changes 
in TFP. Their estimates suggest that capital deepening made modest positive contributions to 
annual labour productivity growth between 2008 and 2011, before contributing a small amount 
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to negative growth in 2012. Harris and Moffat's (2014a) work is supportive of Field and 
Franklin. They find no capital shallowing in the period 2007-12. In fact, on the contrary, there 
appears to have been some capital deepening, something they argue occurred across nearly all 
sectors. Instead, they point to a decline in intermediary inputs as a critical factor in explaining 
declining labour productivity in manufacturing while the decline in labour productivity in 
services is attributed exclusively to declining TFP.17 
 
Further evidence to downplay the role of capital in depressing productivity comes from 
recently-compiled series of capital services. Oulton (2013) and others have argued that capital 
services are to be preferred to capital stocks as a measure of capital input into production, and 
two new series show little evidence of capital shallowing (Goodridge et al., 2015; Murphy and 
Franklin, 2015). Moreover, growth accounting estimates which utilise these new capital 
services series find a very minor role for capital in explaining the downturn in productivity 
growth (Goodridge et al., 2015; Connors and Franklin, 2015). Instead, the productivity puzzle 
appears primarily to be a puzzle about the slowdown in TFP growth.  
 
5.2.8 Incentives to innovate 
The opportunity cost of time and resources is low during recessions due to depressed demand, 
potentially encouraging firms to focus on the reallocation of capital and labour to increase 
                                                          
17 The explanation for declining labour productivity for services appears quite common across 
sub-sectors whereas the authors' sub-sector analysis points to more heterogeneity within 
manufacturing. 
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productivity in time for an up-turn (Geroski and Gregg, 1997: 11). There appears to be a 
moderate degree of work reorganization taking place within workplaces but these changes are 
not significantly associated with the degree to which workplaces were adversely affected by 
recession (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013: 183-184). Instead the extensive work reorganisations 
uncovered by workplace surveys "serve as indicators of managers' willingness to innovate, 
whether in good times or bad" (op. cit., 184). This is also the conclusion Geroski and Gregg 
(1997) came to in their firm-level investigation of resource allocation after the recession of the 
early 1990s.  
 
However, the UK Innovation Survey conducted for the Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills by ONS indicates a marked decline in the rate of both product and process innovation 
in UK firms, although the real expenditure on R&D has remained broadly constant. On the basis 
of these figures Bank of England analysts estimate, however, that the fall in the number of 
product innovators may account for only 1 percentage point of the productivity shortfall 
between 2008 and 2012 (Barnett et al., 2014b: 122-123). 
 
 
5.2.9 Summary 
In summary, the 2008 Great Recession was notable in the UK for three things: the enormity of 
the output shock; the muted unemployment response; and the very slow rate of recovery. At the 
time of writing employment levels are above those experienced prior to the recession, despite 
the fact that these were already high by historical standards. However this positive employment 
story appears to have come at the expense of an unprecedented decline in real wages. Real 
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wages only began rising in the last quarter of 2013, around five years after the beginning of the 
recession. Output only recently exceeded pre-recession levels.  
 
In contrast to countries such as France, the productivity issue has been centre-stage in academic 
and policy debates. A range of factors have been explored in the research literature, ranging 
from measurement error to labour hoarding and capital shallowing, and most of them have been 
found to have at least some degree of salience in explaining recent trends. But for the most part, 
their contributions have been judged to be relatively minor. Perhaps the most important 
conclusion from the work to date is that most of the decline in productivity is within sector and 
within firm. These trends cannot be accounted for by sector-specific shocks and credit 
constraints; instead, a prime contribution appears to have come from declines in TFP. It is 
against this backdrop that we turn to a micro-analysis of workplace-level behaviour between 
2004 and 2011 to gain insights into the processes that may have contributed to this aggregate 
picture. 
 
5.3 New evidence on the UK's productivity puzzle: a workplace perspective 
In this section we use the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) to test some - but 
by no means all - of the hypotheses that might shed light on trends in labour productivity. Our 
focus is on the private sector where the puzzle is most apparent. The unit of analysis is British 
workplaces. The survey is nationally representative of workplaces with 5 or more employees 
across most sectors of the economy but we focus solely on private sector workplaces. Box 5.1 
contains details of the survey. The analyses undertaken in this section focus on the two cross-
sections of workplaces in 2004 and 2011 (plus some analysis of the 1998 cross-section) and the 
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panel of workplaces surveyed in 2004-2011 which permit investigations of within-workplace 
change, something that is particularly useful since estimates of productivity decline from both 
the Bank of England (Barnett et al., 2014b) and Riley et al. (2014b, see Figure 5.5 earlier) 
suggest this was primarily a within-firm, rather than between-firm phenomenon.  
Box 5.1: The Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
 
5.3.1: The 'cleansing' hypothesis 
If, as suggested in Section 5.2, the 'cleansing' effect of the recession was muted, we might expect 
workplace performance prior to recession to have a muted impact on workplace survival 
subsequently. Our analysis of WERS showed that workplaces' financial performance in 2004 
was predictive of whether they had closed by 2011 (Table 5.2). But the overall rate of workplace 
closure between 2004 and 2011 did not differ relative to that observed in the more benign period 
of 1998-2004.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.2 HERE] 
 
Nineteen percent of workplaces in 2004 had closed by 2011, but the rate was 29% among those 
whose financial performance in 2004 was "below" the industry average compared with 8% 
• National survey: mapping employment relations in workplaces across 
Britain. 
• Unique and comprehensive: data collected from managers, worker 
representatives and employees in 2,700 workplaces with 5+ employees. 
• Well-established: 1980, 1984, 1990, 1998, 2004, 2011 
• Linked employer-employee:  
• 2004 and 2011 cross-sections 
• 2004-2011 panel 
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among those with financial performance "a lot better" than the industry average. This 21 
percentage point difference is statistically significant. It falls to a 17 percentage point 
differential when controlling for other factors, but remains statistically significant. In contrast, 
financial performance in 1998 was not significantly associated with closure by 2004, a period 
when economic conditions were relatively benign. These results are consistent with recession 
having a "cleansing" effect by "killing" the poorest performers. However, poor labour 
productivity relative to the industry  average in 2004 did not influence closure probabilities by 
2011 suggesting that, if recession did have a "cleansing" effect in the private sector it operated 
by reducing the survival probabilities of less profitable establishments, rather than those of the 
less productive establishments. 
 
5.3.2: Technological and Organisational Innovations 
If the opportunity costs of production encourage workplaces to innovate when faced with 
recession-induced shocks to demand, we should see a positive correlation between innovation 
and the size of the demand shock experienced by workplaces. However, this prediction is 
predicated on the assumption that the demand shock is temporary, not permanent. If, in fact, 
there continues to be uncertainty facing employers, they may choose to delay innovations until 
they sense an upturn.  
 
In both 2004 and 2011, the Workplace Employment Relations Survey asked HR Managers: 
"Over the last two years has management here introduced any of the changes listed on this 
card?....introduction of performance related pay; introduction or upgrading of new technology 
(including computers); changes in working time arrangements; changes in the organization of 
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work; changes in work techniques or procedures; introduction of initiatives to involve 
employees; introduction of technologically new or significantly improved product or service; 
none of these".18 In general, the incidence of innovation in the two years prior to 2011 was not 
significantly different relative to the two years prior to 2004, although the percentage of 
workplaces reporting changes to work organization rose significantly from 32% to 37%.  
 
Evidence on the incidence of innovation does not provide direct evidence regarding the role of 
recession in workplace innovation, nor its links to workplace performance. To investigate this 
we examined whether there was any correlation between the amount and type of innovation 
undertaken at the workplace and the degree to which HR managers thought their workplace had 
"been adversely affected by the recent recession" (where responses were coded "no adverse 
effect; just a little; a moderate amount; quite a lot; a great deal"). This measure of recession is 
intended to approximate the "shock" workplaces received as a result of the recession.19 In fact, 
it was not associated with the degree to which workplaces innovated in the two years prior to 
the 2011 survey, the only exception being a reduced likelihood of introducing performance pay. 
 
                                                          
18 This 2011 item combines new technology and computers whereas they were contained in 
separate items in 2004. 
19 How adversely workplaces were affected by recession was hard to predict using workplace 
characteristics in 2004, confirming that it came as a "shock" (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013: 16-
18). 
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Product market conditions did, nevertheless, affect the rate of workplace innovation. The 
number of innovations undertaken in the two years prior to 2011 were negatively associated 
with HR managers saying the market for their main product or service was "declining" or 
"turbulent", consistent with the conjecture that uncertainty regarding future demand inhibits 
innovation. The size of these effects is substantial. The mean number of innovations undertaken 
out of a total of up to seven was 2.2. Ceteris paribus, compared to being in a "growing" market, 
being in a "declining" market reduced the number of innovations by 0.5 while being in a 
turbulent market reduced the number by 0.3 - reductions of 23% and 14% respectively.20  
 
Workplaces benefited from the number of workplace innovations they undertook, both in terms 
of workplace performance and in terms of their ability to come out stronger from the recession. 
HR managers were asked to rate their own workplace relative to the industry average on three 
dimensions: financial performance; labour productivity; and the quality of product or service. 
In the survey, responses to these questions on workplace performance are coded on a 5-point 
scale from "a lot better than average" to "a lot below average". The number of innovations 
workplaces put in place was statistically significantly associated with higher labour productivity 
relative to the industry average, and to higher quality of output relative to the industry average, 
                                                          
20 In addition to the variables capturing the impact of recession, the location of the market and 
the state of the product/service market, these models contain the following controls: 
establishment size, single-establishment firm, single-digit industry, region, workplace age, 
union recognition, largest non-managerial occupational group, number of competitors, 
perception of high market competition, perception of high degree of overseas competition. 
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but not with financial performance. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables, 
including the impact of the recession. The implication is that more innovative workplaces had 
higher productivity, both in terms of the quantity and quality of output, but that those 
innovations were costly to make, thus making no significant difference to short-term 
profitability. Nevertheless, the number of innovations undertaken was significantly associated 
with a lower likelihood of agreeing to the statement: "This workplace is now weaker as a result 
of its experience during the recent recession". This association is robust to controlling for other 
variables, including the extent to which the workplace had been adversely affected by the 
recession. The addition of one innovation reduced the probability of agreeing that the workplace 
was weaker as a result of the recession by 3%. Innovating workplaces therefore came through 
the recession in a better state than non-innovating workplaces, but there is some evidence that 
the rate of innovation was depressed among those experiencing a downturn in demand.  
 
5.3.3: Labour hoarding 
Between 2004 and 2011, among those private sector workplaces that survived the period, the 
mean number of employees rose from 38 to 47. When expressed as a percentage relative to the 
average level of employment across the two years, this represents an average growth rate of 11 
percentage points, so a little over 1 percentage point per annum. However this average growth 
rate hides huge heterogeneity across workplaces, as indicated in Figure 5.7. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.7 HERE] 
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If we simply characterise workplaces according to the change in their employment level 
between 2004 and 2011, we can identify three types of workplace: those who experienced a fall 
in employment of over 20 percent ("shrinkers"); those experiencing growth in employment of 
20% or more ("growers") and those in between ("no change"). One-fifth (21%) shrank; two-
fifths (41%) grew; and the remaining two-fifths (39%) experienced no change (Table 5.3). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.3 HERE] 
 
For workplaces with at least 10 employees we can compare workplace growth and shrinkage in 
2004-2011 with rates of employment change in 1998-2004. The patterns are remarkably similar 
with a quarter of workplaces shrinking, a third growing and two-fifths remaining broadly 
similar in size (rows 2 and 3 in Table 5.3). Measuring employment change as the difference in 
levels expressed as a percentage of average employment size in the two periods indicates 
employment grew by 6.2 percentage points between 1998 and 2004 and 5.7 percentage points 
between 2004 and 2011. Here the lack of a sharp distinction between the pre-recession and post-
recession periods accords with the evidence of Butcher and Bursnall (2013). On the face of it, 
this evidence appears consistent with a labour hoarding story, in the sense that employment 
growth patterns appear unaffected by the onset of recession in 2008.  
 
However, there is clear evidence that the impact of the recession did dramatically affect 
employment growth in workplaces. The degree to which HR managers said their workplace had 
"been adversely affected by the recent recession" was strongly negatively associated with 
employment growth (Table 5.4). Whereas 60% of workplaces who had been unaffected by the 
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recession reported employment growth of at least 20%, this was only the case for one-third 
(33%) of those who said they had been adversely affected "a great deal". Conversely, only 7% 
of those unaffected had shrunk by at least 20% compared with 30% of those affected "a great 
deal". Put another way, those unaffected by recession only accounted for 3% of shrinkers, but 
11% of growers, whereas the figures for those affected "a great deal" were 29% and 16% 
respectively. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.4 HERE] 
 
Being adversely affected by the recession was still negatively correlated with the rate of 
employment change among private sector panel workplaces when controlling for observable 
differences between workplaces measured back in 2004. Indeed, in these models - which 
accounted for up to 17 percent of the variance in employment growth between 2004 and 2011 
- the size of the recession effect did not alter significantly with the addition of workplace 
controls.21 When all of the evidence is considered, then, it appears that the recession did lead to 
employment shrinkage in a substantial proportion of workplaces, but there were enough 
workplaces throughout the economy that retained or grew their employment numbers to dilute 
the overall effect on employment growth as shown in Table 5.3.  
                                                          
21 These 2004 controls were: being a single-site firm; industry; region; workplace age; union 
recognition; largest occupational group; and employment size. Other variables performed as 
expected: for instance, employment levels in 2004 were negatively correlated with growth, as 
one would expect given regression to the mean. 
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The labour hoarding hypothesis implies that workplaces may have maintained employment 
levels to the detriment of labour productivity and, perhaps, financial performance. There is 
some support for this proposition. In the period 1998-2004, workplace financial performance 
was independently positively associated with employment growth, ceteris paribus, as one might 
anticipate since it is usually successful firms that grow. By 2004-2011 this was no longer the 
case.22  
 
 
One possible reason for labour hoarding might be the uncertainty surrounding the timing of an 
upturn in the demand for a workplace's goods or services. It is true that workplaces experiencing 
the onset of "turbulent" market conditions nevertheless managed some, albeit low, employment 
growth (Table 5.5). The only workplaces experiencing declining employment were those whose 
market had been in decline in both 2004 and 2011 (Table 5.5). These effects were robust to 
controlling for observable differences across workplaces, including the extent to which the HR 
Manager said the workplace had been adversely affected by recession. If the onset of market 
turbulence is an indicator of greater uncertainty, there is no clear evidence here that it was linked 
to labour hoarding.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.5 HERE] 
                                                          
22 In a similar vein Riley et al. (2015) find that the positive correlation between surviving 
firms' employment growth and their relative productivity ranking broke down after 2007/08. 
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As noted earlier in the chapter, a variant of the labour hoarding hypothesis is that firms have 
hoarded skilled labour. Indeed, WERS shows that skilled employees constituted a growing 
percentage of all private sector employees between 2004 and 2011. Among private sector 
workplaces present in both 2004 and 2011, the percentage of skilled employees - defined as 
those in the top three occupational classifications, namely managers, professionals and 
associate professionals and technical employees - rose five percentage points, from 26% to 
31%. However, what is striking is that this growth was negatively correlated with workplace 
employment growth. In workplaces that had shrunk by at least 20%, the increase in the 
percentage of employees who were skilled was 9 percentage points, whereas it was only 2 
percentage points in workplaces that had grown by at least 20%. The negative correlation 
between workplace employment growth and skilled employment was robust to controlling for 
workplace characteristics.23  This is suggestive evidence that workplaces faced with shrinking 
workforces may have been hoarding skilled labour. However, there was no association between 
changes in the percentage of skilled employees and how adversely workplaces were affected 
by the recession, nor product market conditions. 
 
If "hoarded" skilled labour was generating intangible capital then one might anticipate a link 
between a growth in the percentage of skilled employees and a workplace's ability to innovate. 
                                                          
23 A 1 percentage point decline in employment was associated with a statistically significant 
0.7 percentage point increase in the percentage of skilled employees in models containing the 
same controls as indicated in footnote 21.  
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However, there was no association between growth in skilled employment and workplace 
innovation using the measures of innovation introduced in Section 5.3.2. 
 
Intuitively, if labour hoarding has been taking place, one might also expect an increase in job 
tenure. There has been a statistically significant increase in employees' workplace tenure since 
2004. In the private sector, mean workplace tenure was under two years in one-third (33%) of 
workplaces in 2004, falling to 29% in 2011. The percentage with an average of at least 5 years' 
tenure rose from 37% to 44%. 
 
This section adds to the macro-level data on employment by using workplace-level data to show 
that employment levels within British private sector workplaces held up over the course of the 
recession, perhaps to a surprising degree given the recessionary shock. It is true that the impact 
of recession and the disruption to product markets clearly had a significant impact on 
employment, but there was no extensive shake-out of jobs in British workplaces and the positive 
link between financial performance and employment growth evident in the late 1990s and early 
2000s disappeared in the period 2004-11. Furthermore, the percentage of employees in skilled 
occupations rose, especially in those workplaces whose total employment shrank. Together, 
these findings offer some, albeit limited, evidence in favour of the labour hoarding hypothesis. 
 
5.3.4: A slowdown in HRM investments? 
One area that has not been discussed a great deal in the broader literature on the productivity 
puzzle is that of HRM investments, that is, the human resource practices that managers may 
implement in pursuit of higher productivity. If the recession had reduced the rate at which HRM 
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investments were made – or lowered the rate of return on such investments - this might have 
contributed to a slow-down in productivity growth.  
 
The broad literature on HR practices and workplace performance (e.g. Huselid, 1995; Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2010a) tends to focus on three sets of practices which are expected to have 
positive implications for productivity: first, work organisation practices which give workers a 
greater level of autonomy, aid collaboration and raise their skills; second, performance or 
quality management practices which seek to more closely manage workers’ effort and output; 
and third, incentive pay schemes which seek to motivate workers through financial incentives.  
 
It is apparent from existing work (e.g. Wood and Bryson, 2009) that some of the practices cited 
above, such as team-working and the use of quality targets, became more prevalent in Britain 
over the period 1998-2004, when the economy was growing strongly. Here we investigate 
whether the rate of growth of these practices might have slowed since the mid-2000s, or whether 
the returns to such HR practices might have diminished, in such a way as to have contributed 
to the general slowdown in productivity growth.  
 
Alongside the three sets of practices considered above, we also look at arrangements for 
employee voice. Collective employee representation through trade unions was known to be 
negatively associated with workplace performance in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s, but 
unionisation is known to have weakened in recent decades, whilst arrangements for direct 
communication between managers and employees have grown in popularity (Blanchflower and 
Bryson, 2009).  
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Our analysis again calls on the Workplace Employment Relations Survey, but this time employs 
data from the cross-section surveys of 1998, 2004 and 2011. We use data on private sector 
workplaces with 10 or more employees and, first, chart the incidence of the HR practices 
discussed above over the course of the three surveys. We then examine the associations between 
these HR practices and a subjective measure of workplace productivity in each year, as a rough 
indication of whether there may have been changes in returns.  
 
Table 5.6 shows the percentage of employees who work in establishments where the specified 
practices operate.24 Considering first those practices relating to work organisation and skills, 
we see increases in the use of team working, in the use of functional flexibility and in the 
intensity of training between 2004 and 2011. The rise in team working reversed an earlier 
decline seen between 1998 and 2004, whilst the increased intensity of training represented the 
continuation of a prior trend.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.6 HERE] 
 
Turning to quality and performance-management practices, we see a decline in the use of 
problem-solving groups and a rise in the use of performance appraisals but, again, neither 
change was unique to the period 2004-2011. On incentive pay, we see a small decline in the 
                                                          
24 We prefer this employment share to the share of workplaces with a practice, since larger 
workplaces contribute disproportionately to aggregate levels of productivity.  
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prevalence of share ownership schemes, and in respect of voice, we see the continuation of a 
shift away from sole reliance on representative arrangements and towards the use of direct 
forms of communication, either alone or in combination with forms of employee representation.  
 
On the whole, these patterns indicate a progressive shift away from formal, collective 
approaches to the management of employees and employee performance (i.e. problem-solving 
groups, group-based incentive pay and engagement with unions) towards a more individualistic 
focus that encompasses up-skilling and the direct management of quality and performance. 
However, there appears to be no obvious change in trajectory between 1998-2004 and 2004-
2011. These patterns do not therefore suggest that that the recent period of recession in Britain 
was characterised by any particular slow-down in the diffusion of ‘productivity-enhancing’ HR 
practices.  
 
The evidence for any changes in returns is also weak, insofar as we can gauge with our data. 
WERS only provides accounting data on performance for a small subset of workplaces and so 
we must rely on the subjective rating given by the workplace manager. As noted earlier, they 
are asked to rate the level of labour productivity at their workplace relative to the average for 
their industry and answer on a five-point scale from ‘A lot above average’ to ‘A lot below 
average’. We can then investigate whether specific practices are associated with levels of 
productivity in a given year and whether these ‘returns’ appear to change over time. If the 
returns diminish, this might suggest that increased diffusion of the practice is making a smaller 
contribution to productivity growth going forward. One must, however, accept that there are 
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considerable caveats, given the cross-sectional nature of the data and the subjective nature of 
the performance rating.  
 
The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 5.87 and 5.8. In the first of these tables, the 
individual practices shown in Table 5.6 are included together in an ordered-probit regression of 
the workplace’s subjective productivity rating. Once we control for a set of observable 
workplace characteristics, including the size of the workplace, its industry sector and its 
location, we see no consistent pattern of changing returns. The most notable patterns are a 
reduction between 2004 and 2011 in the productivity advantage conferred by functional 
flexibility, and a reduction between 1998 and 2004 in the productivity disadvantage associated 
with reliance on representative voice.25  Table 5.8 replaces the first six practices with a count 
variable, since key parts of the HR literature argue for the importance of bundles of practices 
(e.g. MacDuffie, 1995). The mean value of this count variable rises from 3.03 in 1998 to 3.11 
in 2004 and 3.46 in 2011, with the increase between 2004 and 2011 being statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. In the regressions it appears that the coefficient on the count 
variable declines between 2004 and 2011, but statistical tests cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients are the same in both years.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5.7 AND TABLE 5.8 HERE] 
 
                                                          
25 This accords with the more general picture of a diminution of ‘negative’ union effects set out 
by Blanchflower and Bryson (2009).  
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Taken together, these results do not indicate any particularly notable break, either in the 
diffusion of HR practices in Britain during the recent recession, or in their impact. The 
overriding impression is, instead, of a continuation of earlier trends towards greater up-skilling 
and more systematic monitoring and assessment of quality and performance. 
 
5.3.5: Falling real wages 
The weakness of real wages was one of the most striking aspects of the recession in the UK, 
and it is strikingly apparent in the WERS data. Asked "Which, if any, of these actions were 
taken by your workplace in response to the recent recession?" private sector HR managers 
identified "Freeze or cut wages" in 38% of cases, making it the most commonly cited of the 
fourteen options identified on the survey show-card. This corresponded with employees' 
experience. When asked "Did any of the following happen to you as a result of the most recent 
recession whilst working at this workplace?" one-quarter (26%) of private sector employees 
said "My wages were frozen or cut", making it the most common response alongside "My 
workload increased". Unsurprisingly the incidence of pay cuts and freezes was strongly 
associated with the extent to which workplaces were adversely affected by the recession. In 
four-fifths (82%) of the cases where HR managers reported freezing or cutting wages, it was 
accompanied by at least one other action, usually to cut costs. For example, over one-third 
(36%) of those freezing or cutting wages had also instituted a freeze of filling vacant posts, 28% 
had reduced paid overtime, 28% had "postponed plans to expand", 27% had made "changes in 
the organisation of work", and 22% had made compulsory redundancies. 
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Further insights can be gleaned regarding pay setting during the recession in relation to the last 
pay settlement for the largest non-managerial occupation at the workplace. The percentage of 
settlements resulting in a pay freeze or cut doubled between 2004 and 2011 from 12% to 26%. 
Again, the influence of recession was in clear evidence: whereas only 15% of workplaces who 
reported no adverse effect of the recession had instituted a pay freeze or cut in the last pay 
settlement for the largest non-managerial occupation, this rose to 36% where the HR manager 
said the workplace had been affected "a great deal". 
 
As noted earlier, the decline in real wages in Britain since the onset of recession is almost 
unprecedented in a period of low inflation, raising questions as to how management has been 
able to make such sizeable wage adjustments. One common hypothesis is that the reduced 
incidence of collective bargaining and a loss of union bargaining power has limited unions' 
ability to block pressures for wage reductions. The incidence of workplace trade unions and 
membership density changed little between 2004 and 2011, although there was a reduction in 
the scope of collective bargaining in the private sector which may be indicative of unions' 
reduced ability to maintain influence over a wide bargaining agenda (van Wanrooy et al., 2013). 
However, unionisation is not correlated with the likelihood of managers saying they froze or 
cut wages in response to the recession, nor to wage freezes or cuts in the last pay settlement for 
the largest non-managerial occupational group. Nor has there been a noticeable decline in the 
size of the union wage premium - instead we see counter-cyclical movement, consistent with 
previous studies (Figure 5.8). It is therefore difficult to pinpoint a break in union power which 
may have provided employers with the opportunity to downwardly adjust real wages. If such a 
change has occurred, it may date back further than the onset of the recession itself. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 5.8 HERE] 
 
There are two other changes which analysts point to as potential reasons for the weakness of 
real wage growth since the recession: welfare reform and immigration. Welfare reform in the 
UK has been extensive in recent years and has focused on increasing labour market participation 
of the inactive and unemployed (OECD, 2013a: 67-77). It can affect employer wage setting and 
job seeker behaviour in a variety of ways that can limit real wage growth. For instance, 
unemployed job seekers may be prepared to accept job offers at lower rates of pay than might 
have been the case in the absence of reform. We are able to identify those workplaces most 
likely to draw applicants from welfare benefit recipients, and thus those most likely to be 
affected by welfare reform, through two data items in WERS, namely whether the workplace 
used the public job placement service to fill vacancies for the largest non-managerial occupation 
at the workplace in the last twelve months, and whether the workplace had special procedures 
to encourage job applications from those who had been unemployed for at least twelve months. 
Neither were associated with pay freezes or cuts in the last pay settlement for the workplace's 
largest non-managerial occupational group, nor were they associated with freezes or cuts in 
wages, or the reduction of non-wage benefits, in response to the recession. Thus, to the extent 
that welfare reform might be expected to impact most on employers engaging with the public 
job placement service and drawing from the unemployed for recruits, there was no discernible 
direct effect of welfare reform on these aspects of wage setting. Of course, it is quite possible 
that the reforms have had other direct effects on wage setting, and that they have had broader, 
less direct effects on the operation of the labour market in general. 
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Although the UK has experienced a very substantial inflow of migrants in the last few years - 
a labour supply shock that could, in principle, slow the rate of real wage growth - the empirical 
evidence on the link between immigration and wages is heavily contested (see Ruhs and 
Vargas-Silva, 2014). In 2011, for the first time WERS collected information on the number of 
non-UK nationals employed at the workplace, distinguishing between those from the European 
Economic Area (the EEA) and those outside.26 Private sector workplaces employed a mean of 
7.6% non-UK nationals in 2011, of whom 3.0% were non-EEA nationals. Although the 
percentage of non-UK nationals employed at the workplace had no bearing on wage freezes or 
cuts that were directly attributed to the recession, and no effect on cuts to non-wage benefits in 
response to the recession, the probability of a pay freeze or cut for the largest non-managerial 
occupational group in the last pay settlement rose with the proportion of non-EEA nationals 
employed by the workplace. One-quarter (26%) of private sector workplaces had instituted a 
pay freeze or cut for the largest non-managerial group of employees in the last pay settlement. 
An increase in 1 percentage point in the number of non-EEA nationals employed at a workplace 
raised the probability of a wage freeze or cut by roughly 0.4 of a percentage point.27 The 
proportion of EEA nationals was not statistically significant. One potential explanation for this 
                                                          
26 The EEA comprises the European Union, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
27 The coefficient on the proportion of non-EEA nationals was -0.52 in the absence of controls 
(t-stat of 3.95), falling to -0.38 (t=2.23) with controls for number of employees, single 
establishment organization, industry, region, union, and largest occupational group. Full results 
are available on request.  
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finding is that a workplace's ability to employ non-EEA nationals reduces the bargaining power 
of employees at that workplace, thus limiting their ability to resist wage freezes or cuts. 
 
If wages have fallen in response to changes in productivity levels we might expect to see 
"Productivity levels within the organisation or workplace" featuring prominently as an 
influence on the last pay settlement for the largest non-managerial occupation in the workplace. 
Table 5.9 compares the influences on pay settlements in 2011 with those in 2004 for all 
settlements and those that resulted in a freeze or cut versus a pay increase. The most commonly 
cited influence is "The financial performance of the workplace or organisation": it accounted 
for over one-third (36%) of responses in 2011, up from 30% in 2004, and was particularly 
salient in settlements leading to a freeze or cut. "Rises in the cost of living" was the second most 
commonly cited factor, and was more salient in cases where the settlement led to a pay rise. 
"Industrial Action threatened or taken" rarely featured in employers' considerations at all, 
perhaps indicating the limitations of unions' influence over pay awards. 
 
Productivity levels accounted for around one-fifth of responses, but they were no more heavily 
cited in 2011 than they were in 2004, nor did they feature more in cases where there was a pay 
freeze or cut. There is therefore little to indicate that productivity had become a more common 
consideration in wage setting as a result of the recession.28 
                                                          
28 These figures are based on the subset of coded responses available in 2004 and 2011. In 2011 
a more extended set of options was provided including reference to the national minimum wage 
for example. Productivity levels accounted for 16% of this more extended set of influences in 
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[INSERT TABLE 5.9 HERE] 
 
5.3.6: Working harder or not so hard? 
There are two competing hypotheses regarding the potential effect of the recession on 
individuals' labour productivity. The first is that the combination of lower product and service 
demand with labour hoarding has created "slack" such that employees are not required to work 
as hard or as "smart" as they were previously. Declining real wages may have contributed to 
this trend since employees may lack the incentive to put in additional effort. The alternative 
hypothesis is that recession has placed additional pressures on employees to increase their 
efforts, either directly following the loss of co-workers, or indirectly through the threat of 
dismissal or replacement by job-seekers.  
 
Although we lack direct measures of individual productivity, employees were asked how 
strongly they agree with the statement "My job requires that I work very hard". The percentage 
of employees who "strongly agree" with this statement increased significantly from 25% in 
2004 to 32% in 2011. This difference remains statistically significant and actually grows in size 
when controlling for observable differences in employees' demographic, job and workplace 
characteristics. How hard people thought they were required to work was not associated with 
how adversely the workplace had been affected by the recession. Instead it was positively 
                                                          
2011, a figure that did not differ according to whether the settlement resulted in a pay increase 
or not. Financial performance was mentioned almost twice as many times (31%). 
43 
 
associated with HR Managers' perceptions of the degree of market competition the workplace 
currently faced. Furthermore, it was positively associated with the number of changes 
employees said had been made to their jobs as a result of the recession.29  Further investigation 
revealed this association was driven by those who said "My workload increased", a response 
given by one-quarter (26%) of private sector employees. The evidence is therefore supportive 
of the proposition that employees were working harder than prior to the recession, partly as a 
result of changes made by management in response to recession, but also due to highly 
competitive market conditions. However, there is little evidence that management were able to 
translate that hard work into a more productive workplace since how hard employees said their 
jobs required them to work was not significantly correlated with HR Managers' perceptions of 
the workplace's productivity relative to the industry average.30 
 
5.3.7: The UK's "flexible labour market" 
                                                          
29 Those who had been in the same workplace during the recession were asked "Did any of the 
following happen to you as a result of the most recent recession?" and were offered nine 
responses. 
30 Analyses of the panel of private sector workplaces revealed that, although there was a positive 
correlation between the mean workplace score for how hard employees worked and the 
workplace's labour productivity and financial performance, this association disappeared having 
accounted for fixed workplace unobservable characteristics (both in workplace fixed effects 
and first difference models) - so there was no association between change in employees working 
hard and improvement in workplace performance. 
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The UK is often characterised as an economy with a very flexible labour force relative to many 
of its EU counterparts for two reasons. First, it is fairly lightly regulated such that employers 
face relatively low dismissal costs and face minimal constraints in terms of the sorts of labour 
contracts they can  utilise (OECD, 2013b). The second aspect, touched upon already, is the low 
incidence and relative weakness of trade unions. For many years it has been argued that unions 
face declining bargaining power and, as such, a reduced ability to influence both wage setting 
(see above) and restrictions on work practices and labour supply. Employers in Britain may 
avail themselves of this labour market flexibility when setting wages, as discussed above, but 
they may also take advantage of it in configuring their workforce. 
 
WERS asks HR managers what types of workers they use, either under contract, or directly as 
employees, to undertake the workplace's business. These include shift-working, fixed-term and 
temporary contracts, freelancers, agency workers, home-workers, zero-hours contracts and 
annual-hours contracts, as well as part-time workers. Such contracts offer employers numerical 
flexibility which can be useful when seeking to adjust the amount of labour they need in 
response to changes in demand such as the onset of recession.  
 
Workplaces were more likely to resort to numerical flexibility via these contracts in 2011 than 
they were in 2004: excluding the use of part-time workers (who were present in 76% of private 
sector workplaces in 2004 and 77% in 2011), half (50%) of workplaces had used at least one 
form of flexible contract in 2004, but this had risen to two-thirds (65%) by 2011 (van Wanrooy 
et al., 2013: 40). There were no striking increases in the use of a particular type of contract, 
with the exception of shift-working which was used in 24% of private sector workplaces in 
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2004 and 32% in 2011. Instead, usage increased marginally across a range of contract types. 
The percentage using two or more such contracts rose from 43% to 57%.  
 
However, the use of numerical flexibility was not associated with HR managers' perceptions of 
how adversely their workplace had been affected by the recession. Instead, if one considers the 
actions employers said they took in response to the recession they tended to involve cost cutting, 
for example through compulsory redundancies, and work reorganisation (van Wanrooy et al., 
2013: 19), consistent with the managerial prerogatives that characterise Britain's "right-to-
manage" model of employment relations. Managers were actually more likely to say they had 
cut the number of agency or temporary staff in response to recession, rather than increase them 
(13% reduced them compared to 3% who increased them), perhaps as a further cost-cutting 
exercise, in the knowledge that core employees could be relied upon to offer numerical 
flexibility through reduced paid overtime (19% of workplaces), and even reduced basic hours 
(15% of workplaces). 
 
To see if workplaces appeared to benefit from greater use of numerical flexibility we sought to 
identify whether there was any correlation between a workplace's use of numerical flexibility, 
its strength emerging from the recession, and its performance in 2011. Conditioning on how 
adversely the workplace had been affected by recession, plus other standard controls (size, 
single workplace organisation, age, industry, region, unionised, and largest non-managerial 
occupational group), there was no association between the intensity with which numerical 
flexibility was used (as measured by the number of types of flexible contract worker used) and 
how strongly the HR manager agreed with the statement "This workplace is now weaker as a 
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result of its experience during the recent recession". Replacing this count variable with the 
variables identifying the type of numerical flexibility used, two practices - shift-working and 
the use of fixed term contracts - were actually associated with a greater likelihood of emerging 
weaker from recession. Similarly, conditioning on the same set of controls, the number of 
numerical flexibility practices was not associated with labour productivity or financial 
performance in 2011. Two practices - fixed term contracts and annualised hours contracts - 
were significantly associated with lower labour productivity than the industry average. 
 
Analyses of the panel of private sector workplaces indicate that workplaces that increased their 
use of numerical flexibility between 2004 and 2011 experienced a deterioration in workplace 
performance, as captured by an additive scale combining scores for financial performance, 
labour productivity and quality of output. This effect was statistically significant and apparent 
in both first difference and workplace fixed effects estimates which account for unobserved 
fixed differences across workplaces. The workplace fixed effects estimates also revealed a 
negative correlation between changes in labour productivity relative to the industry average and 
increased use of numerical flexibility.31 Of course it is not possible to infer causality from such 
estimates. It is possible, for instance, that it is those workplaces whose performance is 
deteriorating who resort to more numerical flexibility practices. Nevertheless, these results 
provide robust evidence that the numerical flexibility employers can use as a result of Britain's 
flexible labour market model is not beneficial in terms of workplaces' performance and 
productivity. 
                                                          
31 Full results are available on request.  
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A priori it is perhaps unclear what impact unionisation may have had on workplace productivity. 
On the one hand, if unions have limited bargaining strength, not only is the upward pressure on 
wages likely to diminish as discussed earlier, but employers are at liberty to pursue profit 
maximisation without regard to their employees' collective voice. This may be advantageous to 
firms if managers have the information and capability to follow the right course of action. It 
may not be so beneficial to firms if, as some argue, managers benefit from effective worker 
voice - as, for example, in the case of firms adopting a "mutual gains" approach whereby firms 
seek to maximise profits via worker involvement, subject to workers benefiting through an 
increased share of those profits (Kochan, 1994). 
 
Neither the presence of a union recognised for pay bargaining nor union density are 
significantly associated with workplace performance in 2011, whether performance is measured 
in terms of the additive performance scale, financial performance or labour productivity. 
However, analyses of the panel reveal that workplaces that experienced an increase in union 
density between 2004 and 2011 also improved their performance relative to the industry 
average, both on the additive scale and in terms of labour productivity.  Similarly, in some 
estimates workplaces that became unionised experienced improved workplace performance, 
though this finding is less robust.32 This is limited evidence in favour of the proposition that 
unionisation may be beneficial to workplaces seeking to improve their performance after the 
                                                          
32 Full results are available on request.  
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recession, perhaps because unions may have adopted a "mutual gains" stance. It runs counter 
to the proposition that firms benefit from a highly deregulated and non-unionised environment. 
 
5.3.8 Summary 
The picture regarding the genesis and explanations for the productivity puzzle derived from 
micro-analyses of the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys is one of complexity and 
heterogeneity. We find clear evidence of labour intensification but employers appeared 
incapable of turning this effort into improved workplace level productivity. There is substantial 
evidence of widespread pay freezes and cuts which help explain the substantial decline in real 
wage growth since the on-set of recession. Pay freezes and cuts were often initiated by 
workplace managers in direct response to the recession. It remains unclear why such wage 
adjustments were possible in this recession when they have been largely absent in earlier 
recessions, but it is possible that employers faced "softer" constraints emanating from union 
power and the need to maintain wage levels to recruit and retain staff. Immigration may have 
played a role: downward wage adjustments were more likely in workplaces using non-UK 
nationals from outside Europe. Workplace closure rates were little different to those 
experienced in more benign conditions prior to the recession, but there is some evidence of a 
"cleansing" effect with poorer performing workplaces being more likely to close.  
 
Employment growth rates vary greatly across workplaces but, on average, they have held up 
well during recession. However, this observation overlooks the impact the recession had in 
workplace shrinkage, especially among those facing declining demand for goods and services. 
There is some evidence of labour "hoarding", especially hoarding of high skilled labour: this 
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has had no discernible impact on the rate of innovation. There appeared to be little change in 
the overall rate of workplace innovation but declining or turbulent demand for goods and 
services limited the degree of innovation in processes and products. There was no discernible 
impact of recession on either the number of HRM practices workplaces invested in, nor their 
returns on those investments. There is no evidence that workplaces have benefited from 
Britain's "flexible" labour market as indicated by using recruitment channels used by welfare 
recipients or the use of numerically flexible workers. On the contrary, workplaces with 
increasing unionisation appeared to benefit in terms of improved workplace performance.  
 
5.4 The Future 
The old orthodoxy that recessions tend to have short-term impacts on output has recently been 
challenged. Instead, a consensus has emerged that "hysterisis" - a long-term effect of recession 
on output due to reduced capital accumulation, scarring effects on workers through job loss, 
and disruptions to economic processes underlying technological progress - is likely. In his 
analysis of 23 OECD countries Ball (2014) finds the Great Recession has had a large impact on 
countries' productive capacity (as measured by estimates of potential output) and that the 
growth rate of potential output is well below what it was before 2008 meaning "the level of 
potential output is likely to fall even farther below its pre-crisis trend in the years to come" 
(Ball, 2014: 2). 
  
Preoccupied with which policy levers to pull and when, economists at the Bank of England and 
elsewhere have been trying to grapple with the evidence to date on the sources of the UK's 
productivity puzzle so as to distinguish cyclical from more persistent economic difficulties. In 
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a recent review Barnett et al. (2014b) emphasise the continued weakness of growth in the UK's 
labour productivity, suggesting that strength in labour hiring and "modest pickup in productivity 
growth suggest that spare capacity within firms is unlikely to explain much of the current 
weakness". Instead, they emphasise the potential for the financial crisis to have a persistent 
effect on productivity levels. Their estimate is that these more persistent factors, such as reduced 
investment in physical and intangible capital, together with impaired resource allocation, may 
account for between 6 and 9 percentage points of the 16 percentage point shortfall in labour 
productivity relative to the pre-crisis trend. At the same time they recognise that "there remains 
considerable uncertainty around any interpretation of the puzzle". 
 
In his analysis of OECD countries Ball (2014: Table 1) suggests the rate of growth in the UK's 
productive capacity is two-thirds of its pre-recession rate, a recessionary "hit" similar in 
magnitude to that experienced by France, much smaller than the impact on Spain, and much 
larger than the impact on Germany. 
 
At the time of writing the UK's labour market was hotting up. Unemployment has been falling 
quite quickly and some real wage growth has returned. Some fear wage "catch up" as workers 
seek to make up for the lost wages incurred since the recession hit. But this scenario assumes a 
degree of worker bargaining power that is not in evidence. As noted earlier, union reach 
continues to decline, albeit slowly, and some parts of its traditional power base - notably public 
sector - face the biggest challenges. There is evidence that a wedge is opening up between 
productivity growth and wage growth, especially among lower paid workers, consistent with 
low and/or diminishing bargaining power. High labour market participation rates may help 
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account for such trends since unemployed labour may more easily substitute for existing labour. 
As Gregg et al. (2014b) note wage growth is unlikely without productivity growth and, they 
maintain, with real wages remaining low, firms' incentives for capital investment remain muted. 
There is thus a 'vicious circle' in which poor productivity begets low wage growth and vice 
versa.33  
 
But perhaps the "acid test" of the recession's impact on the UK's longer-term productivity 
performance is what has happened to TFP. Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013) argue that there has 
been only a small drop in TFP but, as noted earlier, most other researchers who have 
investigated this particular issue judge that the drop in TFP was substantial and forms a key part 
of the story for the UK. For instance, Barnett et al. (2014a) argue that "the change in the capital 
to labour ratio since the crisis can only account for a small part of the shortfall in productivity 
relative to its pre-crisis trend. Therefore, it is likely that much of the fall in measured labour 
productivity is accounted for by a fall in TFP...We make the inference that the loss in labour 
productivity identified...will largely reflect a loss in measured aggregate TFP due to the 
misallocation  of capital across sectors". They suggest the process of capital reallocation since 
2008 has been "unusually slow...relative to previous UK recessions and other banking crises" 
(p. R35), consistent with the possibility that efficient resource allocation may impair the UK's 
longer-term growth prospects. 
 
                                                          
33 The public sector may be an exception: here government intervention in wage setting and 
employment levels will continue, potentially driving productivity growth. 
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In the longer run the UK's productivity trends are likely to reflect the long-tail of poorly 
performing firms that the UK has been noted for over many years. Some of this is due to 
structural factors such as the role of family owned firms, and "poor management" more 
generally in Britain (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010b). Furthermore Britain continues to be 
characterised by laissez-faire economics and politics in the Thatcher mould such that it eschews 
state intervention and shies away from industrial strategy and protects managers' right-to-
manage, even when those managers appear poorly equipped for the job.  
 
However, there are some areas where optimism is merited. London is a global centre, one of 
only a few truly international 'hub' cities benefiting from agglomeration and networking. It 
continues to thrive and prosper, offering safe haven for international capital, migrant labour 
flows and talented entrepreneurs. More broadly, a number of reforms have been undertaken in 
the UK since the 1980s which have provided a foundation for a continuation in the long-term 
productivity catch-up that the country began relative to its competitors in the 1980s. These 
reforms include the expansion of higher education, reforms to welfare systems and labour law, 
and deregulation of capital flows (Aghion et al., 2013). The UK has invested very heavily in 
human capital via growth in participation in higher education. Reforms in other areas, such as 
the welfare system and labour law, also provide for a flexible labour market capable of 
absorbing future shocks, while the deregulation of capital flows and a relatively liberal 
immigration policy ensure the free flow of capital and labour. It remains to be seen whether the 
UK can benefit from these good foundations to make up for the ground it has lost in recent 
years. 
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Figure 5.1 Labour Productivity Growth in the UK, 1971-2014  
 
Source: ONS (2015a: Table 1). 
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Figure 5.2: Speed of Recovery from Recession in the UK 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from NIESR (2015). 
Note: Quarterly average of monthly GDP at market prices. 
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Figure 5.3: Employment levels in recent recessions 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (2015d) 
Note: All workforce jobs (seasonally adjusted) 
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Figure 5.4 Liquidations as a percentage of all companies on the register
 
Source: Insolvency Service (2014) 
Note: The Enterprise Act (2002) introduces a discontinuity to the series in September 2003, as 
it introduced a streamlined process for administrations whereby companies can, in some 
circumstances, be dissolved without recourse to liquidation. 
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Figure 5.5: Decomposition of labour productivity growth into within and between firm 
components 
 
Source: Riley et al. (2014b) 
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Figure 5.6 Under-employment versus unemployment, 2001-2013 
 
Source: Bell and Blanchflower (2015) 
Note: The underemployment index measures the excess supply of hours in the economy. It 
compiles a total measure of surplus hours by adding together (i) the hours that the unemployed 
would work if they could find a job and (ii) the change in hours that those already in work 
would prefer. This is then expressed as a percentage of the sum of hours worked and surplus 
hours to give the under-employment rate. 
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Figure 5.7: Employment Growth, 2004-2011, private sector panel 
 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
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Figure 5.8: Union Membership Wage Premium, 1994-2012  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Labour Force Survey 
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Table 5.1 Numbers of self-employed and employees in the UK, April-June, 2008-2012 
 
  
Self-employed 
(Thousands) 
Employees 
(Thousands) 
Self-employment rate 
(%) 
2008 3,810 25,416 13.0 
2009 3,790 24,817 13.2 
2010 3,896 24,783 13.6 
2011 3,957 25,011 13.7 
2012 4,176 24,983 14.1 
Source: Labour Force Survey 
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Table 5.2: Rates of workplace closure 2004-2011 by relative financial performance in 2004 
Financial Performance 
relative to industry average 
in 2004: 
Raw: Controls: 
 Closure 
rate 
Marginal Effect Closure 
rate 
Marginal effect 
Below .29 - .25 - 
Average .17 -.12 .17 -.09 
Better .20 -.10 .21 -.04 
A lot better .08 -.21 .08 -.17 
Notes: Managers are asked: "Compared with other workplaces in the same industry how would 
you assess your workplace's financial performance...a lot better than average, better than 
average, about average, below average, a lot below average". We combine the last two 
categories. Marginal effects are estimated relative to base case of "below average" performance. 
Underlined marginal effects are statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. Models 
based on 1,527 observations (1,525 with controls). Controls are: single digit industry; region; 
single-establishment firm; establishment size; workplace age; largest occupational group. 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
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Table 5.3: Employment Change as a Percentage of Base Year Employment Level, Private 
Sector Panel 
 Shrunk by at 
least 20% 
No Change Grew by at least 
20% 
2004-11, at least 5 employees: 21 39 41 
2004-11, at least 10 employees: 25 40 34 
1998-2004, at least 10 
employees: 
24 42 34 
Notes: (1) row percentages (2) Row 1 N=1,370; Row 2 N=1172; Row 3 N=591 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
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Table 5.4: Employment Change and Impact of Recession, 2004-2011 
Row percentages 
Recession 
Impact: 
Shrunk by at 
least 20% 
No Change Grew by at least 
20% 
None 6.9 33.1 60.1 
A little 10.3 38.5 51.2 
Moderate 16.8 46.8 36.5 
Quite a Lot 25.7 34.9 39.4 
A great deal 29.7 37.7 32.6 
All 20.4 39.0 40.7 
Notes: (1) Row percentages (2) Private sector panel, all with 5+ employees (3) N=1,366 (4) 
Recession impact are responses to the question "Looking at this card, can you tell me to what 
extent your workplace has been adversely affected by the recent recession?" 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
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Table 5.5: Employment Change in 2004-2011 and Changing Demand for Goods and 
Services, Panel Workplaces in Private Trading Sector 
 
Product/service 
demand: 
Growing Turbulent Declining 
Always 20.2 9.7 -25.6 
Started 19.5 5.0 7.5 
Stopped 4.6 19.4 31.5 
Never 11.1 12.7 10.4 
Notes: (1) Figures are mean employment change between 2004 and 2011 expressed as a 
percentage of the average employment level for the workplace in 2004 and 2011 (2) Demand 
for services/goods based on responses to the question: "Looking at this card, which of these 
statements best describes the current state of the market in which you operate [for your main 
product or service]...the market is growing, the market is mature, the market is declining, the 
market is turbulent". (3) N=1,257 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
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Table 5.6: Share of employment in private sector workplaces with specific HR practices, 
1998-2011 
75 
 
 1998 2004 2011 2004 v 
1998 
2011 v 
2004 
2011 v 
1998 
 % % % Signif. Signif. Signif. 
Work organization:       
Semi-autonomous team-
working+ 
44 35 48 *** ***  
Functional flexibility+ 79 78 82  **  
Training for 80%+ experienced 
employees+ 
21 41 49 *** *** *** 
       
Quality management:       
Problem-solving groups 49 34 30 *** * *** 
Quality targets 55 58 63    
Appraisals for 80%+ non-
managerial employees 
53 69 78 *** *** *** 
       
Incentives:       
Profit-related pay 53 44 43 ***  *** 
Share-ownership scheme 32 33 28  **  
       
Voice:       
Representative + Direct 26 31 33 **  *** 
76 
 
Representative only 43 28 24 *** * *** 
Direct only 11 21 23 ***  *** 
Neither 20 20 19    
Base: employment in private sector workplaces with 10+ employees 
Notes: + for the largest occupational group 
Key: *** = sig. at 1 per cent; ** sig. at 5 per cent; * sig. at 10 per cent 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
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Table 5.7: Ordered probit regression of labour productivity on specific HR practices, 
private sector, 1998-2011 
78 
 
 
1998 2004 2011 1998 2004 2011 
 
      
Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
      
Semi-autonomous team-
working^ 0.162 0.045 0.048 0.097 -0.022 0.062 
 
[1.26] [0.44] [0.50] [0.80] [-0.21] [0.63] 
Functional flexibility^ 0.303** 0.278** 0.010 0.393*** 0.264** 0.055 
 
[2.16] [2.51] [0.10] [2.94] [2.46] [0.53] 
Training for 80%+ experienced 
employees^ -0.067 0.027 -0.059 -0.073 0.006 -0.112 
 
[-0.49] [0.25] [-0.63] [-0.51] [0.05] [-1.15] 
Problem-solving groups 0.071 0.129 -0.049 0.045 0.119 0.011 
 
[0.61] [1.06] [-0.39] [0.41] [0.96] [0.08] 
Quality targets 0.065 -0.072 0.196** 0.138 -0.052 0.157 
 
[0.58] [-0.65] [2.04] [1.18] [-0.46] [1.65] 
Appraisals for 80%+ non-
managerial employees 0.096 0.218* 0.122 0.024 0.253** 0.157 
 
[0.76] [1.93] [1.17] [0.19] [2.04] [1.40] 
Profit-related pay 0.011 0.181* 0.098 0.184 0.216** 0.067 
 
[0.08] [1.71] [0.99] [1.36] [2.08] [0.66] 
Share-ownership scheme 0.163 -0.213* 0.050 0.213 -0.211 0.075 
 
[1.18] [-1.73] [0.41] [1.59] [-1.62] [0.60] 
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Voice (ref = None): 
      
Representative + Direct -0.111 0.062 0.191 -0.159 0.237 0.160 
 
[-0.67] [0.39] [1.39] [-0.98] [1.51] [1.05] 
Representative only -
0.399*** -0.053 0.021 -0.436*** 0.249 -0.001 
 
[-2.75] [-0.34] [0.13] [-2.95] [1.54] [-0.01] 
Direct only 0.084 0.194 0.153 0.050 0.081 0.133 
 
[0.43] [1.43] [1.27] [0.26] [0.59] [1.08] 
N 1259 1210 1337 1258 1210 1337 
Base: private sector workplaces with 10+ employees 
Control variables: workplace size; industry sector; region; largest occupational group; whether 
part of multi-site organisation; number of competitors in main market; degree of competition 
in that market; whether market local/regional/national/international; whether market 
growing/mature/ declining/ turbulent.  
Key: ^ questions refer to the largest occupational group at the workplace 
*** = sig. at 1 per cent; ** sig. at 5 per cent; * sig. at 10 per cent [t-statistics in parentheses] 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
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Table 5.8: Ordered probit regression of labour productivity on count of HR practices, 
private sector, 1998-2011 
 
1998 2004 2011 1998 2004 2011 
 
      
Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
      
Count of HR practices 0.113*** 0.103*** 0.051 0.111*** 0.091** 0.057 
 
[2.77] [2.75] [1.53] [2.92] [2.32] [1.60] 
N 1259 1210 1337 1258 1210 1337 
Base: private sector workplaces with 10+ employees 
HRM count is a count of the number of HR practices from (min=0; max=6).  
Control variables: as listed under Table 5.7, plus whether any profit-related pay, any share 
ownership scheme, and type of voice arrangement.  
Key: *** = sig. at 1 per cent; ** sig. at 5 per cent; * sig. at 10 per cent [t-statistics in parentheses] 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
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Table 5.9: Influences on the Most Recent Pay Settlement for the Largest Non-Managerial 
Occupation 
 
 2004 2011 
 All Freeze/cut Increase All Freeze/cut Increase 
Financial 
Performance 
30 36 29 36 44 34 
Productivity levels 21 23 21 19 18 19 
Changes in Cost of 
Living 
24 11 26 21 17 22 
Recruitment and 
Retention 
21 16 21 13 11 14 
Industrial Action <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
None of these 4 14 3 12 11 12 
N workplaces 1750 182 1587 1756 379 1346 
Notes: (1) Responses to question: "Looking at this card, which of the factors listed influenced 
the size of the pay settlement or review for [largest occupational group]?" (2) Figures are 
column percentages based on N responses, so adding to 100.  
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
 
 
